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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein the Plaintiff appeals
from an award of attorney's fees and from an award of
alimony, both awards having been made to the Defendant
in the action below, Defendant not having by her pleadings
and response to Plaintiff's Complaint requested attorney's
fees or alimony, but where those responsi v·e pleadings
were filed on the day of the trial and where in earlier
proceedings the Court specifically reserved issues pertaining to attorney's fees therein.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, by and
through the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge, heard this
matter and awarded Respondent the sum of $1,500.00 for
attorney's fees in connection with this matter and further
awarded Respondent the sum of $150.00 per month for eighteen
(18) months as alimony.

The Court made other rulings which

are not pertinent to this appeal, Appellant not having
raised them in his brief (Brief of Appellant, Isaac Cruz,
Page 3.)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the order of
the District Court awarding Respondent attorney's fees
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and awarding them in the amount granted and further
seeks affirmance of the Court's order requiring Plaintiff
to pay the alimony to the Respondent and in the amount
granted.

Respondent further seeks attorney's fees for

her response to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about November 13, 1978, Plaintiff filed
his Verified Complaint against Defendant (R. 2-7) ·.

There-

after, Respondent filed and served upon Plaintiff an
Order to Show Cause and Restraining Order (R.14-15),
Affidavit of Respondent (R.16-18) and Motion to Determine
Temporary Custody (R.13).

A hearing was held upon that

matter before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court on December 22, 1978
(Ro28-29).

That matter involved the Appellant's taking

of the minor child of the parties and refusing to allow
Defendant to have any visitation whatever with the child
or custody.

In confirmance of the allegations made in

Respondent's Affidavit in connection with her Order to
Show Cause (R.16-18), the Court found, after having
heard testimony of the parties and their witnesses and
the arguments of counsel, that "the minor child of the
parties was taken from the Defendant [Respondent] by the
Plaintiff [Appellant] by threats of intimidation.
(R.28)

Respondent was successful in having the child

-2-
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II

returned to her.

The Court ordered, in connection

therewith, "that there was no determination as to
child support or attorney's fees, both issues being
reserved for a future determination."

(R-29}.

That

December 22nd date was the last available Court date
prior to the Christmas holidays (R.220} and Respondent
and her counsel were required to spend the entire day
in Court in an attempt to get the matter heard.
223-225}.

(R.220,

Respondent's attorney's fees for the conduct

of this case through trial included the time and efforts
expended on behalf of the Respondent (R.221} at the
December 22nd hearing.
Subsequently, on or about March 23, 1979,
Respondent served upon Plaintiff an Order to Show Cause
and supporting Affidavit (R.85-89} seeking, among other
things, an award of alimony and an award of attorney's
fees in connection with that particular action.

The

hearing on the matter was held April 4, 1979, before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court, and made its order in connection therewith wherein Respondent was "required to pay to the
Defendant, Michele Cruz, the sum of $300.00 per month
as temporary alimony and support for the benefit of
herself and her minor child during the pendency of this
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action.

It is understood that the Plaintiff, Isaac

Cruz, is a teamster and is currently on strike.

During

the course of the strike that is underway at the date
of this hearing Mr. Cruz shall be required to make
payments of $100.00 per month during the course of the
strike as a temporary child support and alimony payment
to the Defendant.

At such time as the strike is resolved

Mr. Cruz shall immediately reinstate his payments at the
amount of $300.00 per month, payable to the Defendant,
Michele Cruz." (R.95).

As to attorney's fees, the

Court ordered that "determination of whether or not the
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees for
having to bring this action against the Plaintiff shall
be reserved until the time of trial".

(R.96).

No responsive pleading to Plaintiff's Complaint
had been filed through this date nor had any objections
been made to that failure.

On the day of trial and in

open Court, a responsive pleading was filed to Plaintiff's
Complaint

(R.115), but which failed to request attorney's

fees or alimony on behalf of Respondent although they had
both been clearly in issue through the course of this matter
as shown above and through contact with Plaintiff's counsel
prior to the time of trial (R.223).
-4-
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Trial was had in this matter on June 7, 1979,
before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the Third
Judicial District Court.

Evidence was introduced at

the trial in behalf of the Respondent regarding an award
of alimony (R.201-240), an award of attorney's fees
(R.220-225), and Respondent's due but unpaid amounts
under the Order of Temporary Support in the amount of
$500.00 (R.191-193; 199-200), the Appellant having paid
only $200.00 under that prior order through the date of
trial.
The Court entered its Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce on
September 4, 1979 (R.131-139).

On October 23, 1979, the

Court heard the Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (R.143)
and on November 8, 1979, entered its Order denying that
motion (R.145).

Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO DEFENDANT
OR IN THE AMOUNT AWARDED

The Order appealed from regarding the alimony to
Defendant ordered that "the Defendant is awarded $150.00 a
month alimony for eighteen months, at which time, the alimony
is to cease, in its entirety."

(R.132).

Substantial testimony
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was elicited from each of the parties regarding their
financial conditions at the time of trial (Plaintiff:
R.170-176, 178-184, 199; Defendant: R.201-207, 209-211,
216-217).

Appellant in his brief does not appear to

contest the amount of alimony awarded but rather that
there was an award at all.

Regardless of whether the

amount of the award is in question, it appears that it
is a matter that can readily be disposed of by this Court,
should the Court decide that an award in this case is
justified,by virtue of (a) the Appellant's failure to
contest the size of the award in his Brief on Appeal,
and (b) the various presumptions ordinarily applied to
review of decisions of the lower court, namely, that
this Court should not disturb the action of the District
Court where there is a reasonable basis in the evidence
to support the Court's action (Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d
499 (Utah 1976)), should review the decision below in a
light most favorable to the prevailing Respondent in the
case below (Nyman v. Cedar City, 361 P. 2d 1114, 12 U 2nd 45),
and should not overturn the judgment below unless the
Appellant is able to prove that the judgment is such a
serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court (Searle vs. Searle, 522 P.2d
6 9 7 (Utah 19 7 4 ) ) .
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The real question appears to be whether
the Court should have made any award of alimony to
the Defendant at all.

The Appellant argues, through

his counsel, that he was "mislead in this regard by
the Defendant's failure to counterclaim or file an
affirmative answer or in any manner request . . .
alimony".

(Brief of Appellant, Page 2).

This case

presents an unusual circumstance in that the responsive
pleading was not filed until moments before the actual
trial of the case.

The Plaintiff's Complaint was signed

and filed on November 13, 1978, and trial was held on
June 7, 1979, a period of nearly seven months from date
of filing to date of trial.

During this period of time

an award of temporary alimony was sought by the
Defendant/Respondent and obtained for the pendency of
this action as mentioned above.

Prior to the trial,

settlement attempts were made which included contact
between the attorneys regarding payment of alimony to
the Defendant, as also mentioned above.

Thus, right

up until the time of trial, the issue of alimony was,
in a practical sense, still an open issue.

Counsel

for Plaintiff had failed throughout the pendency of
this action to require Defendant to file a responsive
pleading or to take advantage of her failure to do so.

-7-

•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under those circumstances it might be said that Plaintiff
waive his right to a timely notice of issues to be presented at trial, including the issues of alimony and
attorney's fees.
Additionally, there is the plain fact that
counsel for Plaintiff represented the Plaintiff at the
April 4, 1979, hearing wherein the Court specifically·
reserved. the issue of an award of attorney's fees "until
the time of trial" (R.96).

Plaintiff was on clear and

unambiguous notice that at the time of trial attorney's
fees would be an issue in some degree yet, Appellant
claims that the "Defendant refused to raise the issue
of alimony or attorney's fees" and that the Plaintiff
was "denied a full opportunity to meet this issue ... ".
(Brief of Appellant, Page 3).

He further asserts that

"the Plaintiff had a right to assume and rely on the
fact that the Defendant was not requesting ... attorney's
fees.

(Brief of Appellant, Page 3).
Another aspect of Appellant's argument relates

to the procedure of the presentation into evidence of
the issue of alimony.

The transcript relevant to this

is as follows:
Question:

Is it your desire that Mr. Cruz
pay alimony in a month for a
period of time until you are able
to regain some kind of stability
economically for yourself?
-8-
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Answer:

Yes.

Mr. Miner:

Object to that question,

your Honor.
The Court:

Overruled.

Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
which is substantially similar to the Federal Rules
provides the manner of making an objection and the
effect thereof.

It states in sum that the party needs

to both make known to the Court his objection and his
grounds therefor.

It is patent that no grounds for

the objection whatever were asserted by Plaintiff.
It is also apparent that the Plaintiff did have ample
opportunity to object at the time the ruling was made
so that his objection does not fall within the exception
provided in Rule 46.

Additionally, Rule 4(a) of the

Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "A verdict or
finding shall not be set aside, nor shall a judgment
or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a) there appears
of record objection to the evidence timely interposed
and so stated as to make clear the specific grounds of
the objection ... ".

The objection was timely interposed

but in no way made "clear the specific ground of objection."
(See Magill v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., C.A. 3rd (1972)
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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404

~

F.2d 294 to the effect that the Court of Appeals would
not consider an argument based upon an objection to a
question but which objection never set forth the ground
urged on appeal for reversal; Redevelopment Agency of
Salt Lake City vs. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47).

Ergo, the

Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complaint of the admission
into evidence of the request for alimony regardles of
the status of the pleadings and after admission into
evidence properly became an issue in the case.
The remaining question appears to be that of
whether the award of alimony to a Defendant in a divorce
action is proper in any event.

Section 30-3-5(1), Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides that when a
decree of divorce is made "the Court may make such orders
in relation to the

parties, in the maintenance of

the parties ••• as may be equitable."

The statute makes

no distinction between husband and wife or plaintiff and
defendant but affirmatively requires the Court in a
divorce action to review the circumstances of the parties
and to enter an order based thereon as may be equitable.
In this case, the Court below did review the circumstances
of the parties and made an award that can certainly be
considered equitable under the circumstances.

The award

was for a relatively small monthly amount over a strictly
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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limited and brief duration.

The statute seems to

imply on its face that regardless of the pleadings
on both sides in a divorce action, the Court can
enter whatever order it chooses as long as it is
equitable and, presumably supported by the evidence.
This would appear to leave open the possibility of
both parties in a divorce action being unprepared
to meet the issues the Court may find relevant in
a divorce action.

This statute substantially and

specifically extends well beyond the provisions
generally made for judgment as contained in Rule 54
{c) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
seems to imply that relief can be given·only to
one affirmatively requesting it.

The divorce statute

quoted specifically mandates, without reference to
request for affirmative relief, that the Court review
the circumstances of the party and enter a judgment
that is "equitable".

It appears, therefore, that a

divorce action is a "heads up" ball game wherein the
pleadings are not determinative in the action or at
least have far less effect on the ultimate ruling of
the Court than would be the case in all other types of
actions.

This interpretation seems to be confirmed

by the provision~ of Section 30-3-3, U.C.A., wherein
-11-
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it states that "The Court may order either party to pay
to the clerk a sum of money for the separate support
and maintenance of the adverse party and the children,
and to enable such party to prosecute or defend the
action."

Again, this statute does not make reference

to plaintiff and defendant or husband and wife.

Given

the foregoing, i t appears that the Court did have power
to enter its award or alimony.
The conclusion that the Court was justified
in making its award of alimony (and its award of attorney's
fees) is further bolstered by the ruling of this Court
in Palombi v. D and C Builders, 452 P.2nd 325, 22 Utah 2nd
297 (1969) wherein the Court ruled that even though there
was no request for an attorney's fee in the plaintiff's
Complaint, because the action was governed by a statute,
in this case lien statute, the statute in effect was
incorporated by reference into the pleading and thereby
justified the Court in awarding an attorney's fee.

While

the divorce statute is not so explicit as the lien statute
involved in that case (Section 38-1-18, u.c.A., 1953), in
a like manner it may, nevertheless, be incorporated into
the pleadings of both parties to a divorce action and in
this case specifically to support the awards given to the
Respondent.
-12-
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The Court, in the Palombi case, cautioned,
however, that it was important that the issue be raised
at some point in order to give the parties a full
opportunity to meet it, which would presumably apply to
Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

In the

present case, however, it may not matter greatly whether
or not the divorce statute is interpreted in the same
manner as the lien statute, i.e., incorporating the
terms of the statute into the pleadings of the parties
by implicit reference.

This is so because in the

present case the specific issues complained of are the
award of alimony and the award of attorney's fees.

In

both of these matters the Plaintiff had prior notice
that these issues may or would be raised at the time
of trial.

Plaintiff did not complain at the time

of trial that he was surprised by the issue of alimony
{or the issue of attorney's fees), but rather could
fairly assume over the pendency of the action that
inasmuch as no responsive pleading had been filed it
might be of issue at trial.
It might be noted as well that in his brief
Appellant states that he would have no objection to the
award had the matter been pleaded and tried (Brief of
Appellant, Page 2).

It is submitted that Plaintiff
-13-
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has made no case that an award granted to Defendant
would be any different than that already entered by
the Court nor to show that it is in any way inequitable.
It might also be noted that Plaintiff was given full
opportunity to examine or cross-examine the parties
and other witnesses.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent submits
that the Court's award of alimony was properly granted
in a reasonable amount and that the judgment of the
Court should be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO DEFENDANT OR IN THE AMOUNT
GRANTED
The Court will recognize that a substantial
portion of the argument contained in Point I is applicable
to Point II, the issue of the award of attorney's fees, and
thus the arguments there will not generally be repeated.
Counsel for the Respondent was sworn and testified without objection as to the December, 1978, Order to
Show Cause and the April, 1979, Order to Show Cause and
the trial in this matter (R.220-221).

Specifically

included in that testimony, again without objection, was
testimony to the effect that the amount of attorney's
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fees expended included "today's trial time" (R.221),
i.e. the divorce trial.

The testimony was to the

effect that the Respondent's attorney's fees were
incurred on an hourly basis (R.224) and that in
excess of 25 hours had been expended in behalf of
Respondent, including the one-half day in trial (R.131).
The December 1978 hearing necessitated Respondent and
her counsel to spend the entire day, the last court
day before Christmas, in order to be heard in their
attempts to regain custody of the Respondent's son
(R.220), i.e. from 9:00 o'clock in the morning until
5:00 p.m. that afternoon (R.224).

Additionally,

time was spent preparing the Order to Show Cause·,
Temporary Restraining Order, the Affidavit and the
Motion to Shorten Time in preparing the Order to Show
Cause and Request for Temporary Alimony and Support
in April of 1979, as well as discovery, correspondence
and attempts to work out visitation and support between
the parties (R.220-221).

It is apparent from the

record that a substantial amount of the time spent by
the attorney for the Respondent, and therefore, the
attorney's fees incurred, where in connection with
matters specifically reserving the attorney's fees as
an issue until trial.

Unopposed and uncontroverted

testimony was also given that the attorney's fees were
reasonable (R.221).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It clearly appears that an undetermined but
substantial portion of the attorney's fees awarded by
the Court are completely justified as being awarded in
relation to the earlier orders of the Court which held
in abeyance until trial the issue of attorney's fees.
Counsel for Plaintiff cross-examined Respondent's
counsel on the issue of his attorney's fees, but did
not inquire as to a breakdown of those fees, although
the cross-examination was apparently of the scope
desired by Plaintiff's counsel.

(R.225).

It should be

noted that no objection had been raised to the introduction of evidence regarding the attorney's fees in
any manner.

Therefore, the objections urged now on

appeal that were not urged in the trial court should
not be considered by the reviewing court in absence
of a showing of any special circumstances why such
objections were not made below (Steele v. Wilkinson, 349
P.2d 1117, 10 U 2d. 159} and inasmuch as the Plaintiff
had full opportunity to object he has not come within
the exception provided in Rule 46, that if a party
has no opportunity to object that the absence of an
objection will not thereafter prejudice him.

(Rule 46,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Hanks v. Christensen,
354 P.2d 564, 11 U 2d. 8).

In any event, the award

-16-
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of attorney's fees has long been held by the Court to
be a matter of discretion for the trial judge in a
divorce case and that in absence of clear abuse of
that discretion the Court's award will not be disturbed.
(See for example, Bader v. Bader, 424 P.2d 150, 18 U.2d
407 (1967); conversely see Alldredge v. Alldredge,
229 P.2d 681, 119 U. 504 (1953)).
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent submits
that the Court's award of attorney's fees was properly
granted in a reasonable amount and that the judgment of
the Court should be affirmed.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This case presents an unusual circumstance
in that while a divorce was granted to the Plaintiff
and no affirmative relief was sought in Respondent's
pleadings, the Court, nevertheless, in granting the
Plaintiff's divorce, awarded the Defendant alimony
and attorney's fees.

As to each the Plaintiff claims

surprise because no affirmative relief was sought in
the Respondent's pleadings below.

Those pleadings

were filed, however, on the day of trial, after a
seven month pendency of the case before trial

Respon-

dent additionally had been, in an earlier proceeding,
awarded temporary alimony.

Thus, a claim of surprise
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does not appear well-founded.

Utah law specifically

allows such an award to be made absent affirmative
requests in the pleadings, and finally, during the
course of the trial, Plaintiff failed to appropriately
object to the Respondent's request for attorney's fees.
Even had that objection been properly made, however,
the Court had within its discretion the power to make
such an award and did so after a review of the circumstances of the parties.
As to attorney's fees, it appears likewise
that no timely objection was made or attempted regarding
the issue of attorney's fees to be awarded to Respondent
at trial of her action below.

The record clearly shows

that the issue of attorney's fees on two prior proceedings
specifically reserved for the time of trial the issue
of attorney's fees which prior hearings appear to
represent a substantial portion of the attorney's fees
granted even if Appellant was unjustly surprised by the
attorney's fees issue.

It thus appears that under the

circumstances of this case under the statutes of the
State of Utah cited, and under case law the Court in its
discretion reasonably awarded alimony and attorney's fees
to the Defendant and in reasonable amounts.

The Order
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of the Court below should be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of
March, 1980.
HUNT, LAREW & KINATEDER

B~h'~ ~~
~t)~
Hollis S .( Hunt

Melvin G. Larew, Jr:C:
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
345 South State Street, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent were served upon the
Plaintiff/Appellant by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, to Mark

s.

Miner, Attorney for Plaintiff/

Appellant, 525 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this 14th day of March, 1980.
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